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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 11/03/2004 Accident number: 32 
Accident time: 10:55 Accident Date: 10/05/1996 
Where it occurred: Namaacha, Maputo 
Province 
Country: Mozambique 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Detection accident Date of main report: 20/05/1996 
ID original source: ADP-7/MC/AN/BF Name of source: CND/IND/ADP 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: OZM-4 AP Bfrag Ground condition: metal fragments 
grass/grazing area 
 
Date record created: 22/01/2004 Date  last modified: 22/01/2004 
No of victims: 3 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 




An internal investigation dated 20th May 1996 was made available. Its content is summarised 
here.  
The demining platoon had been at the site since 11th March 1996. The minefield was a 
defensive ring on largely flat ground with long grass and small bushes. Mines found 
previously included POMZs and an OZM-4. The ground was contaminated by fragments from 
mines that had gone off. The deminers were using shears and detectors. They were supplied 
with "protective clothing" comprising a cotton apron, boots and industrial safety glasses. 
Victim No.1 was working downhill without his detector and was two metres in front of the end 
of his end-of-lane marker when the accident occurred at 10:55. He pulled a tripwire and 
initiated an OZM-4 that was a metre away. He suffered traumatic amputation of his left foot.  
Two other deminers were slightly injured with single fragments to the elbow and chin. The 
Platoon Commander ordered a helicopter from Maputo. The platoon paramedic gave first aid.  
One of the UN investigators arrived with the helicopter at 12:00. It left with Victim Nos.1 & 2 at 
12:05. Victim No.3 was evacuated by road. Victim No.1 had an operation at Maputo Central 
Hospital and the other two victims were released after treatment. 
The investigators felt that if SOPs had been followed the accident could have been avoided. 
SOPs stated that slopes must be cleared uphill [there was "ambiguity" about how the base of 
a slope should be reached]. They believed that Victim No.1 was interpreting the SOP as he 
thought best and walked through an uncleared area to reach the base of the slope. The usual 
supervisor (subcontracted from a commercial demining company) was away, which may have 




The investigators found that Victim No.1 and his partner had cleared 25 metres in three hours 
(the normal rate was 4-5 metres per hour). Fragments were found in the part of the lane they 
had cleared. The lane began at a width of 1m, expanding to 1.75m. They concluded that 
Victim No.1 was not using his detector at the time. They felt there was no doubt that the 
principle cause was Victim No.1's negligence and also blamed a lack of supervision. Had the 
usual supervisor been present the breaches of SOP would have been noticed.  The section 
commander failed to take responsibility for safety by failing to stop the victim working too fast. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators made lengthy recommendations including reinforcing the need to remove all 
metal and expanding the group's operational procedures. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 46 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: US$1,188 Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: Safety spectacles 
 
Summary of injuries: 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
2 
Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
An accident report (written in Portuguese) dated 15th May 1996 stated that Victim No.1 had an 
amputation of the left foot and was then treated in the Special Clinic of Maputo Central 
Hospital.   
A medical report stated that the victim was judged to be 50% incapable of doing any work, 
with a permanent physical disability of 70%. It was recommended that his suitability for other 
employment should be assessed after six months. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 47 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: Safety spectacles 
 




No medical report was made available. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 48 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: not recorded 
 





No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the main 
victim was in breach of SOPs and his errors went uncorrected. The secondary cause is listed 
as “Inadequate training” because it seems that the Victim did not know the risks he was 
taking. 
It is not clear what the victim was doing when he initiated the mine. Quite how he tripped a 
tripwire on a bounding mine and lost a foot without suffered wide fragment injury is unclear. It 
would make more sense if he stepped on the trigger mechanism of the fuse, or the mine were 
a non-bounding type. 
It is possible that the SOPs and/or training were inadequate, which would represent failings 
higher in the management chain.   
 
Related papers 
The recommendation of the UN Compensation Committee  was that compensation of 36% x 
30 x US$110 (salary) = US$1,188 be paid to victim No.1.  
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